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Available online 27 August 2011Emotion biases feature prominently in cognitive theories of depression and are a focus of
psychological interventions. However, there is presently no stable neurocognitive marker of
altered emotion–cognition interactions in depression. One reason may be the heterogeneity of
major depressive disorder. Our aim in the present study was to find an emotional bias that
differentiates patients with melancholic depression from controls, and patients with
melancholic from those with non-melancholic depression. We used a working memory
paradigm for emotional faces, where two faces with angry, happy, neutral, sad or fearful
expression had to be retained over one second. Twenty patients with melancholic depression,
20 age-, education- and gender-matched control participants and 20 patients with non-
melancholic depression participated in the study. We analysed performance on the working
memory task using signal detection measures. We found an interaction between group and
emotion on working memory performance that was driven by the higher performance for sad
faces compared to other categories in the melancholic group. We computed a measure of “sad
benefit”, which distinguished melancholic and non-melancholic patients with good sensitivity
and specificity. However, replication studies and formal discriminant analysis will be needed in
order to assess whether emotion bias in working memory may become a useful diagnostic tool
to distinguish these two syndromes.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.Keywords:
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Emotion1. Introduction
A bias for negative information is central to cognitive
theories of depression (Beck, 1976; Mathews and MacLeod,
2005). Patients with depression have shown selective
attention to sad but not angry or happy faces on a dot
probe task (Gotlib et al., 2004) and mood-congruent (that is,
negative) evaluation of neutral or ambiguousmaterial (Gotlib
and Joormann, 2010). A similar preference for negative
information was observed in long-term memory studies in
patients with depression or dysphoric individuals (Gilboa-ychiatric Genetics and
n).
Y license.Schechtman et al., 2002; Jermann et al., 2008; Ridout et al.,
2003, 2009), most consistently in those employing free recall
(Gotlib and Joormann, 2010). Such biases are not conﬁned to
the visual modality but have also been demonstrated for
emotional prosody (Péron et al., 2011).
However, not all studies show emotion biases, let alone
performance improvements for negative material in depres-
sion. The evidence is most consistent for tasks where patients
have to suppress memory traces of negative material such as
negative priming (Goeleven et al., 2006; Joormann, 2004) or
directed forgetting of self-referential words (Power et al.,
2000), where socially relevant stimuli such as faces are used,
and where presentation times are relatively long (1 s or more)
(De Raedt and Koster, 2010). Moreover, most previous studies
on emotion-speciﬁc effects on attention and memory have
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performance enhancements (De Raedt and Koster, 2010).
Only a few studies have speciﬁcally probed emotional
working memory biases in depression. This is surprising
because the active maintenance of mood-congruent material
in working memory would constitute a particularly pervasive
cognitive bias because of the wide range of functions that
depend on working memory. In one study patients (but not
healthy individuals undergoing sad mood induction) took
longer to reject intrusions from irrelevant word lists if they
contained negative material (Joormann and Gotlib, 2008).
The authors suggested that this indicates the reduced ability
to remove previously relevant negative material from
working memory when it has become irrelevant and that
this dysfunctional cognitive style might sustain ruminations.
Global working memory impairment, reported in some
studies (Rose and Ebmeier, 2006), does not seem to account
for emotion biases in depression (Gotlib and Joormann,
2010).
The absence of a clear sad beneﬁt in dysphoria in other
previous work (Noreen and Ridout, 2010) may be explained
by the characteristics of the sample of that study, which
included only healthy individuals who scored high on a
depression scale. Deveney and Deldin (2004) did investigate
patients with Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) and did not
ﬁnd a bias for sad faces in working memory, but they used a
load of only one face. Face working memory performance at
load 1 may be close to ceiling for all categories (Jackson and
Raymond, 2008). Our previous work has shown that emotion
effects on face WM start to emerge only at a load of two faces
(Jackson et al., 2009). In the present study we therefore used
a working memory protocol where participants had to retain
two faces, which has shown good sensitivity to detect
emotion biases in patient groups (Linden et al., 2010;
Subramanian et al., 2010).
Another reason that previous work on cognitive biases has
not yielded stable neurocognitivemarkers of depression could
be the heterogeneity of the depressive syndrome. In particular,
most studies did not adopt the clinically important distinction
between melancholic and non-melancholic depression. It isTable 1
Demographic and clinical data for both clinical groups and control participants.
Non-melancholic depression
N/mean SD
Participants 20
NART 113.05 8.98
Age 42.90 11.16
Male/female 14/6
Right/left-handed 19/1
HDRS-21 20.85 7.24
Illness duration [months] 174.30 106.09
Antidepressants TCA: 1⁎
SSRI/SSNRI: 12⁎⁎
Other: 3
No medication: 4
⁎+Lithium
⁎⁎1+lithium and 1
+atypical antipsychoticoftenargued thatmelancholia is a severe formof depressionon
a continuum of depressive illness. However, the concept of
melancholia as a distinct clinical entity has recently received
considerable support (Parker et al., 2010; Taylor and Fink,
2008). This separation of melancholia from other depressive
subtypes, which we adopt here, is based on its distinct clinical
features (psychomotor disturbances, quality of mood, lack of
mood reactivity, vegetative signs) and different treatment
responses (Hildebrandt et al., 2003; Parker et al., 2010; Perry,
1996). The diagnostic signiﬁcance of psychomotor distur-
bances as a distinguishing feature between melancholic and
other subtypes of depression has been supported by several
studies (Parker, 2007; Schrijvers et al., 2008). The DSM-IV
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders) allows
a speciﬁcationofmelancholic subtype of depressiondeﬁnedby
clinical symptoms and signs. It is widely recognised that the
depressive syndrome in its current deﬁnition is in many
respects too broad, and that clinical and neurocognitive
subtyping is needed. This study was intended to contribute
to the identiﬁcation of a potential cognitive marker for
depression, or speciﬁcally for melancholia, through a negative
emotional bias in working memory.
2. Method
2.1. Participants and diagnostic assessment
20 outpatients with melancholic depression, 20 healthy
age-, gender- and handedness-matched controls, and 20
outpatients with non-melancholic depression participated in
the study (Table 1). All participants gave written informed
consent after full explanation of the study procedures. The
study was approved by the ethics committee of the School of
Psychology, Bangor University, and the Local Research Ethics
Committee of the National Health Service. The control
participants, who were recruited through the University's
community panel, reported no history of neurological or
psychiatric disorder or illicit drug use. Authors S.L. and D.H.,
board-certiﬁed psychiatrists, conﬁrmed the clinical diagnosis
of depression according to DSM-IV-TR-criteria (AmericanMelancholia Controls
Melancholia
N/mean SD N/mean SD
20 20
111.10 10.79 113.85 9.66
50.80 10.44 48.50 13.76
10/10 11/9
19/1 17/3
25.05 7.49
205.90 177.65
TCA: 7⁎
SSRI/SSNRI: 10⁎⁎
Other: 1
No medication: 2
⁎2+atypical antipsychotic
⁎⁎2+atypical AP
1+lithium
1+valproate
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view for DSM-IV (SCID) (First et al., 2002). We only included
patients aged between 18 and 65 with MDD, excluding
patients with a Major Depressive Episode in Bipolar Disorder.
We further excluded patients with comorbid other psychiat-
ric, neurological or substance-related disorders. The severity
of depressive symptoms was assessed with the 21-item
Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression (HDRS) (Hamilton,
1980).
The differentiation into melancholic and non-melancholic
depression was based on the criteria for the DSMMelancholic
Features Speciﬁer and was made by the same two psychia-
trists, who were initially blind to the outcome of the
experiments. However, our criteria were stricter than those
of the DSM-IV manual, where one A criterion and three B
criteria are required to make the diagnosis “with melancholic
features”. In order to meet the inclusion criteria for our study,
patients had to fullﬁll all eight criteria (2 A criteria and 6 B
criteria, see Table 2). We reasoned that such strict criteria
would result in the identiﬁcation of purer melancholic
syndromes and enhance the chance of identifying neurocog-
nitive markers in a relatively small sample. The criteria were
applied to the most severe period of the current MDD
episode. None of the patients in our non-melancholic group
met the broader DSM-IV criteria for a “with melancholic
features” diagnosis.
We assessed pre-morbid verbal intelligence with the
National Adult Reading (NART) test (Russell et al., 2000).
We ruled out deﬁcits in face recognition with the Benton test
(Benton et al., 1983). In this test participants match target
faces to simultaneously presented test faces. The test is
administered in a booklet and there is no time constraint. All
participants had normal or corrected to normal vision.
2.2. Procedure
2.2.1. Experiment 1: working memory for emotional faces
We assessed working memory for emotional faces with a
modiﬁed version of the paradigm reported in Linden et al.
(2010). In this task participants were oriented to the centre of
the computer screen by a small ﬁxation cross presented for
1000 ms (Fig. 1). At the start of each trial, the ﬁxation cross
increased in size for 1000 ms after which it returned to its
original size for another 1000 ms. Then two faces and two
scrambled faces were presented for 2000 ms in a 2×2Table 2
Criteria for melancholic features speciﬁer (according to DSM-IV)
(partly quoted verbatim).
Group A (1) loss of pleasure in all, or almost all, activities
(2) lack of reactivity to usually pleasurable stimuli
(does not feel much better, even temporarily, when
something good happens)
Group B (1) distinct quality of depressed mood (i.e. the depressed
mood is experienced as distinctly different from the kind
of feeling experienced after the death of a loved one)
(2) depression regularly worse in the morning
(3) early morning awakening
(at least 2 h before usual time of awakening)
(4) marked psychomotor retardation or agitation
(5) signiﬁcant agitation or weight loss
(6) excessive or inappropriate guiltencoding array that subtended 2.86° visual angle in width
and 2.96° in height. After a 1000 ms blank retention interval a
single face was presented in the centre of the screen and
participants were asked to decide whether this face had been
present in the previous display by pressing either yes or no on
the keyboard.
All faces in any one trial displayed the same emotion, thus
there was no competition between emotions for WM
resources. The task involved an identity decision (“was this
person present or not?”) and emotional expression was
irrelevant to the task. Responses were not speeded and no
feedback was provided, and participants were free to
disengage ﬁxation. We did not include a verbal suppression
task because patients could not cope with this extra cognitive
load when engaging with the task.
Stimuli were displayed on a 13-inch Toshiba laptop
monitor (32 bit true colour, resolution 1024×768 pixels),
generated by E-Prime software (Version 1.1; Schneider et al.,
2002). Greyscale face images of six adult males each
expressing ﬁve emotions (angry, happy, neutral, sad, fearful)
were used. The faces were taken from the Ekman and Friesen
collection (Ekman and Friesen, 1976). 16 trials per emotion
were presented in a pseudo-random order in four blocks.
2.2.2. Experiment 2: emotion classiﬁcation
We investigated the ability to classify facial emotions
using the same six male faces from the Ekman set with seven
different emotional expressions (happy, angry, neutral, sad,
disgusted, fearful, surprised). E-Prime software was used and
faces were displayed on a 13-inch Toshiba laptop monitor.
The experiment consisted of 42 trials (each of the 6male faces
in 7 different emotions shown once). In each trial a face with
an emotional expression that subtended 3.6° visual angle in
width and 4.5° in height, appeared along with the seven
written emotion labels printed below it. The participant's task
was to identify the expression displayed on the face by
clicking the correct emotion label with the computer mouse.
2.2.3. Experiment 3: arousal and valence ratings
We investigated participants' arousal and valence judge-
ments with a computerised version of the self-assessment
manikin (Bradley and Lang, 1994). Participants rated the
arousal (calm = nonaroused to exciting = aroused) and
valence (pleasant = positive to unpleasant = negative)
associated with the face on a nine point scale. Only the ﬁve
emotions used in experiment 1 and items correctly cate-
gorised in experiment 2 by the participant were included in
the valence and arousal ratings.
2.3. Participant matching
Wematched the control group to themelancholic patients
for age, handedness and gender. There was no difference
between any of the groups in premorbid intelligence as
measured by the NART (melancholic patients: 111.10 [10.79],
controls: 113.85 [9.70]; non-melancholic patients: 113.05
[8.98], F(2,57)=0.413, p=.663). There was a trend in the 1-
way ANOVA to a main effect for age, which was driven by
lower age in the non-melancholic patient group, F(2,57)=
2.343, p=.105. Chi square test did not reveal signiﬁcant
group differences in gender or handedness (all psN .2).
Fig. 1. The emotional face paradigms. (A)Working memory. Participants viewed two faces (expressing the same emotion, angry, happy, sad, fearful or neutral) for
2 s. The 4 position array was chosen because of compatibility with other work probing load effects on emotional working memory (Jackson et al., 2009) and with
our previous work in patients with Parkinson's disease (Subramanian et al., 2010) and schizophrenia (Linden et al., 2010). After a 1 s interval, a probe face with the
same emotional expression was presented and participants had to judge whether it matched one of the previous faces in the encoding display. (B) Expression
classiﬁcation task for the basic emotions. Participants categorised emotions with the appropriate labels. (C) Arousal/valence ratings. Participants rated how
aroused and pleasant each face made them feel using the self-assessment manikin.
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D prime (d′) scores on the working memory task, percent
correct on the categorisation task and arousal and valence
ratings were our dependent measures. D′ scores are comput-
ed as the difference between z-transformed hits and false
alarms and represent the standard performance measure for
change detection tasks (Green and Swets, 1966).We analysed
the dependent measures in separate repeated measures
analyses of variance (ANOVAs) with the between-subject
factor “group” (three levels: controls, melancholic patients,
non-melancholic patients) and the within-subject factor
“emotion” (ﬁve levels for the WM task and the arousal
and valence ratings; seven levels for the classiﬁcation task).
P-values were Greenhouse–Geisser corrected where the
assumption of sphericity was violated. We followed up the
main effects and interactions with post-hoc one-way ANO-Table 3
D′ (d prime) performance values (and SE in parentheses) of the differen
groups across emotional categories on the face working memory task.
Non-melancholic
depression
Melancholia Controls
Angry 3.32 (0.23) 2.91 (0.31) 3.88 (0.17)
Happy 2.91 (0.27) 2.36 (0.19) 3.66 (0.23)
Neutral 2.93 (0.27) 2.65 (0.22) 3.48 (0.21)
Sad 3.02 (0.28) 3.45 (0.22) 3.33 (0.22)
Fearful 2.87 (0.30) 2.23 (0.33) 2.91 (0.19)tVAs, Scheffe or t-tests, as appropriate. We also correlated
the size of the sad beneﬁt (performance difference between
sad and the average of all other faces: d′sad− (d′angry+
d′happy+d′neutral+d′fearful) /4) with the HDRS scores and
duration of illness.
3. Results
3.1. Working memory (experiment 1)
The ANOVA of the d′ values of the working memory task
(Table 3) showed main effects of emotion, F(4,228)=5.208,
pb .001, and group, F(2,57)=4.995, p=.01, and an interac-
tion between emotion and group, F(8,228)=2.074, p=.039.
Separate one-way ANOVAs for each group revealed main
effects of emotion in the melancholic patients, F(4,76)=
4.773, p=.002 and controls, F(4,76)=4.629, p=.002, but
not in the non-melancholic patients, F(4,76)=0.653, p=.63.
Pairwise comparisons revealed signiﬁcantly higher perfor-
mance for sad compared to happy, t(19)=5.970, pb .001, 2-
tailed, fearful, t(19)=3.261, p=.004, and neutral, t(19)=
2.563, p=.019, faces, and a trend to higher performance for
sad compared to angry faces, t(19)=1.774, p=.092, in the
melancholic group. Of these, the contrasts sad vs. happy and
sad vs. fearful survive Bonferroni correction for 10 compar-
isons. There was no peak for sad faces in any of the other
groups (Fig. 2). In the control group, the signiﬁcant (surviving
Bonferroni correction) pairwise comparisons were angry
vs. fearful, t(19)=4.288, pb .001, happy vs. fearful, t(19)=
Fig. 2. Performance of patients with non-melancholic depression, melan-
cholia and healthy control participants on the working memory task for
angry, happy, neutral, sad and fearful faces, measured in d′ values (y-axis)
and their standard errors of the mean.
able 5
AM ratings (and SE in parentheses) of the different groups for arousal.
Non-melancholic
depression
Melancholia Controls
Angry 0.89 (0.26) 0.97 (0.25) 1.03 (0.18)
Happy 0.28 (0.24) −0.32 (0.40) 0.16 (0.29)
Neutral −0.17 (0.23) −0.37 (0.17) −0.84 (0.30)
Sad 0.22 (0.14) 0.45 (0.26) 0.52 (0.12)
Fearful 1.03 (0.23) 0.90 (0.30) 1.01 (0.22)
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p=.002. Thus, the interaction between the factors group
and emotion was driven by the different direction of emotion
effects in the melancholic (better memory for sad faces) and
control (worse memory for fearful faces) groups.
The performance difference between sad and the average of
all other faces (d′sad−(d′angry+d′happy+d′neutral+d′fearful)/4)
(“sad beneﬁt”) differentiated between patients with melan-
cholic depression and controls, and between patients with
melancholic and non-melancholic depression with 80% sensi-
tivity and 80% speciﬁcity. The cutoff point of the d′ difference
was 0.5.
3.2. Emotion classiﬁcation (experiment 2)
The ANOVA of the accuracy scores (Table 4) on the
emotion classiﬁcation task showed a main effect of emotion,
F(4.454,253.869)=19.993, pb .001, but no interaction
between emotion and group, F(8.908,253.869)=1.216,
p=.286, and no group effect, F(2,57)=2.090, p=.133. The
main effect of emotion was driven by better classiﬁcation
accuracy for happy faces compared to all other conditions
(all psb .001).
3.3. Arousal and valence ratings (experiment 3)
Patients and controls showed no major differences on
arousal and valence ratings (Tables 5 and 6). The ANOVA
of the arousal data showed a main effect of emotion,
F(3.180,162.165)=17.540, pb .001. Neither the main effect
for group nor the interaction between the two factors wasTable 4
Accuracy (and SE in parentheses) of the different groups for emotion
recognition.
Non-melancholic
depression
Melancholia Controls
Angry 0.71 (0.04) 0.65 (0.06) 0.82 (0.05)
Happy 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.99 (0.01)
Neutral 0.70 (0.05) 0.73 (0.07) 0.74 (0.06)
Sad 0.78 (0.04) 0.72 (0.05) 0.87 (0.03)
Fearful 0.76 (0.04) 0.63 (0.06) 0.65 (0.06)
Surprise 0.90 (0.03) 0.91 (0.03) 0.90 (0.03)
Disgust 0.79 (0.06) 0.80 (0.04) 0.87 (0.04)T
Ssigniﬁcant. Arousal ratings were signiﬁcantly higher for angry
and fearful faces compared to all other conditions (all
psb .001) (but did not differ between angry and fearful
faces) and for sad, pb .001, and happy, p=.028, compared to
neutral faces.
The ANOVA of the valence data showed a main effect of
emotion, F(1.844,94.041)=89.347, pb .001, but no signiﬁcant
main effect of group and no interaction. The main effect of
emotion was driven by higher valence for happy compared to
all other faces (all psb .001), lower valence of angry, fearful
and sad than neutral faces (all psb .001) and lower valence of
angry, pb .001, and fearful, p=.004, than sad faces.
3.4. Performance correlation with symptoms
Spearman correlation between sad beneﬁt in the melan-
cholic group and HDRS scores revealed no signiﬁcant
association, rho=−.006, p=.971, 2-tailed. Likewise, Pearson
correlation between the sad beneﬁt and duration of illness
showed no signiﬁcant association, r=−.136, p=.404.
4. Discussion
Our ﬁnding of a sad beneﬁt in face working memory
supports the cognitive theories of melancholic depression
that posit a bias for negative, particularly sad information.
However, such biases can also be obtained through negative
mood induction in healthy individuals (Bower, 1981; Bradley
et al., 1997; Ridout et al., 2009), especially in at-risk
individuals (Joormann et al., 2007), which has raised the
question whether the negative emotion bias is secondary to
themood change. Yet negative biasesmay also persist beyond
depressive episodes and thus constitute a vulnerability
marker to rather than a consequence of the illness (Fritzsche
et al., 2010; Gotlib and Joormann, 2010; Joormann and Gotlib,
2007). The lack of correlation of the “sad beneﬁt” with
symptom severity or duration of illness in our study suggests
that it is not a consequence of the mood change but might
rather be a primary neurocognitive feature of melancholic
depression. Although cognitive bias theories have greatlyTable 6
SAM ratings (and SE in parentheses) of the different groups for face valence.
Non-melancholic
depression
Melancholia Controls
Angry −1.15 (0.23) −2.10 (0.27) −1.44 (0.20)
Happy 1.58 (0.28) 2.38 (0.32) 1.75 (0.28)
Neutral 0.14 (0.13) 0.35 (0.20) 0.35 (0.16)
Sad −0.97 (0.17) −1.41 (0.28) −1.00 (0.18)
Fearful −1.12 (0.29) −1.83 (0.32) −1.46 (0.22)
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applied productively in the development of cognitive beha-
vioural therapies, the question of causality has remained open
(Mathews and MacLeod, 2005). Findings of cognitive biases
that are independent of severity of symptoms, as in the
present study, lend some support to a causal (rather than
reactive) role of cognitive biases in the development of
depression. However, ultimately this question will have to be
addressed by longitudinal studies in high-risk individuals.
The present paradigm will be useful for studies that address
the question whether cognitive biases predict the develop-
ment of depression, and whether their remediation helps
with symptom improvement.
Melancholic and non-melancholic depression are distinct
clinical syndromes and may dissociate on some biological
measures (Gold and Chrousos, 2002; Parker et al., 2010;
Power et al., 2000). However, most neurocognitive studies
of depression have not investigated these syndromes
separately. Our results provide strong evidence that different
cognitive processes underlie these two syndromes because
patients with non-melancholic depression essentially
showed the same pattern as controls (albeit with descrip-
tively slightly impaired performance), whereas patients with
melancholic depression showed an altered emotion bias both
compared to controls and non-melancholic patients. These
neurocognitive differences between melancholia and non-
melancholic depression may lend further support to the
inclusion of melancholia as a separate entity in the DSM-V.
In a recent study with a similar paradigm in patients with
Parkinson's disease (PD) we found increased performance for
sad faces in the hypodopaminergic state, which reverted to
the “normal” preference for angry faces after dopaminergic
treatment (Subramanian et al., 2010). The monoamine
systems show multiple interactions with the HPA axis,
and lack of dopamine has been postulated particularly for
melancholic depression and psychomotor symptoms
(Martinot et al., 2001; Schrijvers et al., 2008). Dopaminergic
agents have antidepressant properties both in PD (Yamamoto
and Schapira, 2008) and depression (Dhillon et al., 2008).
One tentative explanation of the negative cognitive bias in
melancholic depression may thus be that it reﬂects an
underlying dopaminergic deﬁcit. This needs to be tested
further in intervention or radioligand studies. Failure to
differentiate according to clinical subsyndromes may be one
of the reasons why radioligand studies have so far failed to
provide conclusive support for monoaminergic deﬁcit models
of depression (Nikolaus et al., 2009).
Because only patients who were experiencing a depressive
episode were included we cannot ascertain whether the sad
beneﬁt in WM persists during remission and may be an
enduring emotional bias contributing to vulnerability to
relapse. Furthermore, in the absence of direct evidence from
neuroimaging or effects of speciﬁc pharmacological interven-
tions in patients with depression, our interpretations of the sad
beneﬁt as indicator of dopaminergic hypofunction is presently
still speculative. Another limitation is that our melancholic
patients were more severely depressed, according to HDRS
scores, than the non-melancholic patients. However, this
difference is unlikely to have accounted for the qualitative
difference in emotion biases, and we found no signiﬁcant
correlation between the sad beneﬁt and symptom severity.The identiﬁcation of patients with melancholic depression
requires an in-depth interview, a careful clinical history and
often observation over an extended time period. An initial
neurocognitive screening tool could therefore be of clinical
use for early identiﬁcation. The successful classiﬁcation of
melancholia patients vs. controls and vs. non-melancholic
patients with 80% sensitivity and speciﬁcity is therefore of
potential clinical interest, but formal testing of its sensitivity
and speciﬁcity in distinguishing melancholic from non-
melancholic depression through discriminant analysis in an
independent sample would be required. If the sad bias is
indeed a marker of lack of dopamine, it should revert after
treatment with dopaminergic (and possibly other catechol-
aminergic) agents, thus providing a neurocognitive treatment
marker. Our ﬁnding would thus respond to the widely
recognised need for additional outcome measures that are
independent of self-report.
Finally psychological interventions that target dysfunc-
tional cognitive biases and metacognitive beliefs such as
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) could speciﬁcally focus
on patients' bias for sad material. In addition to explicit
strategies, implicit procedures using operant conditioning or
distractor devaluation may be possible. Moreover, changing
the sad bias in working memory and other cognitive domains
may become a new outcome measure not only for pharma-
cological treatment but for psychological interventions as
well.
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